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Over the years, a majority of donors has progressively adopted similar contracting
practices. Emphasis is put on "transferring technology" to perceived "knowledge poor"
beneficiaries which, in combination to tied aid and/or rigid tendering processes has
gradually resulted in the removal of beneficiaries from aid activities. Most often,
beneficiaries of our generous assistance are not in charge of assessing and designing
projects nor are they tasked with or involved in implementing them. Lastly, they are not part
of evaluation process teams responsible for assessing results and drawing lessons from
these activities. The practices, which often apply also in the case of "institutional building
activities", result in disempowerment of the recipients and reduce buy-in to new ideas,
behaviour and values implicit in each project. In addition to being condescending to
beneficiaries, they obscure the capacity of indigenous institutions to provide adequate
counselling to their own governments, in effect disenfranchising them. In essence, a vast
majority of projects is managed by the donor agency in a supply driven turnkey fashion
contrary to common sense and pedagogical experience.
In the following text, we will endeavour to explain IDRC's methodology and vision and
describe the six year experiment in assisting Ukrainian institutions in researching and
designing policies for the management of the Dnieper River. We will describe the strikingly
different context prevalent in this transition country as compared with the South, the main
outputs and results achieved. We will finally summarise the key lessons learned after six
years of partnership in Ukraine.
IDRC’s own presentation will be complemented by Dr. I. Iskra's findings as he will
summarise the perceptions of a group of Ukrainian recipients and partners involved in
IDRC's programme. He will stress "likes and dislikes" as well as key lessons-learned from
this social and cooperation experiment. 
How do you teach new things to people?




The International Development Research Centre (IDRC) is a public corporation created by
an Act of the Parliament of Canada in 1970. The main elements of the Act provide IDRC
with its legal mandate "...to initiate, encourage, support and conduct research into the
problems of the developing regions of the world and into the means for applying and
adapting knowledge to the economic and social advancement of those regions." (full text of
the Act is available at http://www.idrc.ca/institution/eact.html).
In order to enable IDRC to meet the challenges of its mandate, the Parliament of Canada
determined that the Centre would benefit from an extraordinary degree of autonomy. It is
not an agent in law of the government, nor are its employees government employees. Yet,
despite this measure of political autonomy, IDRC remains accountable to the Parliament of
Canada and its operations are audited annually by the Office of the Auditor General.
Unique to IDRC as well is its governance structure. It is led by a 21member international
Board of Governors. Eleven governors, including the Chairperson, are from Canada, while
of the remaining 10, historically, 8 or 9 have usually come from developing countries and
the others from developed countries.
The core of IDRC's funding is a yearly grant from Parliament. While the grant is critical to
IDRC's work, provisions in the Act allow the Centre to enter into a variety of joint-ventures
and consortia. Currently, IDRC manages the funds and coordinates the implementation of
more than 50 projects on behalf of private, bilateral, and multilateral organisations such as
CIDA, USAID, SIDA, UNDP, WHO, UNICEF, the World Bank, and the Asian Development
Bank.
IDRC works with governments, universities, private businesses, remote communities,
development organisations, and international agencies throughout the world. It has
experience in consensusbuilding and the development of multi-donor consortia for longterm
support for research and training programmes; it was named by Canada as a lead
organisation in the implementation of Agenda 21 at the UN Conference on Environment
and Development in 1992. The Centre hires staff from around the world, basing them in
Ottawa and in regional offices located in Cairo, Dakar, Johannesburg, Nairobi, New Delhi,
Montevideo, and Singapore, as well as in project offices, like that in Kyiv. It employs a
multi-disciplinary team of scientists, technicians, managers, and policymakers with broad
experience in the physical, social, life, and information sciences and is capable of
administering large international projects. For support in its endeavours, IDRC draws upon
a network of development experts from around the world. It has access to diverse networks
of development thinkers and researchers, scientists, and policymakers world-wide and is
unhampered by "tied aid" issues in choosing or hiring partners.
Over thirty years, the Centre has provided more than $2 billion in support of over 5,000
research projects in 100 countries involving more than 20,000 researchers and 1,000
institutions.
1.2 The IDRC vision
The Centre believes that sustainable and equitable human activity depends on men's and
women's control of their own social and economic progress, on commensurate access to
knowledge of all kinds, and on an indigenous capacity to generate and apply knowledge.
The mission of IDRC is "empowerment through knowledge," i.e., helping to optimise the
creation, adaptation, and ownership of the knowledge that the people of developing
countries judge to be of greatest relevance to their own prosperity, security, and equity.
This mission represents an essential contribution to redressing the imbalances in global
prosperity and access to knowledge.
It is vital that the peoples of developing and transition countries be in a position to control
their own "knowledge-based" development. Therefore, strengthening capacity for research,
independent policy analysis, and accessing knowledge are critical. Analytical capacity in
these countries must be strengthened to ensure that they can contribute as informed
participants in major international debates, e.g., WTO and climate change. They must be
able to deal directly with issues of direct domestic concern, like governance and economic
policy, where, in the absence of indigenous capacity, the analysis by external actors may
be all that is available and will carry undue weight. These considerations influence the
programme choices that IDRC makes.
IDRC recognises that respect for human rights and their promotion are integral parts of
sustainable and equitable development, and are fundamental to research being carried out
under conditions of intellectual liberty and unrestricted communication of results.
As written in the Parliamentary Act, IDRC is enjoined "to enlist the talents of natural and
social scientists and technologists of Canada and other countries," "to encourage generally
the coordination of international development research," and "to foster cooperation in
research on development problems between the developed and developing regions for
their mutual benefit." These have all provided and will continue to provide direction to the
activities of the Centre. The cornerstone of IDRC's future work will be an ever stronger link
to the aspirations and needs of the people in the developing and transition countries of the
world. During the next five years, directed by the aims enshrined in the IDRC Act of 1970,
the Centre will pursue the following strategic goals:
• to foster and to support the production, dissemination and application of research
results leading to policies and technologies that enhance the lives of people;
• to mobilise and to strengthen the indigenous research capacity of developing
countries, especially directed to achieving greater social and economic equity, better
management of the environment and natural resources, and more equitable access
to information; 
• to establish or consolidate networks of research institutions that are focused on
specific problems and are connected among themselves and with the broader global
knowledge communities.
1.3 IDRC's methodology
Access to knowledge must be equitable. The ability to carry out analysis, to review options
critically, and to write and to speak about them publicly - in short, to generate and to use
knowledge - makes a vital contribution to social progress. This requires social innovation.
There is no such thing as a technological fix. The technical ingenuity of humanity has far
outstripped its ability to design and apply the policy, managerial, educational, governance,
and institutional innovations required to improve well-being and to redress the stark
inequities around us. Each society must devise its own solutions while learning what it can
from the experience of others.
Organisations like IDRC must contribute to strengthening the scientific and analytical
capacity of developing countries. In the Centre's case, this continues to mean creating
opportunities for our developing and transition country partners to carry out research and to
work as equals with their peers in the rest of the World. Developing and transition countries
must be able to be full participants in the discussions and arrangements that are driving,
and responding to, profound global changes.
In fulfilling its mission of "empowerment through knowledge," the Centre has concentrated
on encouraging and supporting researchers in the developing world to carry out their work
in their own institutions and, in so doing, has assisted the developing regions, as stated in
the Act of Parliament, "...to build up the research capabilities, the innovative skills, and the
institutions required to solve their problems." Unlike most development agencies, which hire
outside consultants to study a problem, to conduct training, and to issue a report, IDRC's
proven methodology utilises local institutions to determine their own needs and to carry out
the necessary work. By looking first to indigenous institutions when providing research
grants, IDRC not only helps to build self-confidence in those institutions, but also 
strengthens those institutions' research and technical capacities. Moreover, because
research is carried out by locals for locals, a greater measure of "buy-in" is insured than if
the work, however valid and technically sound, were carried out by outside consultants. A
risk in using local capacity is that output quality can suffer: IDRC therefore uses its in-house
expertise and world-wide networks of researchers and experts to guide researchers and to
provide input and to bridge knowledge or technology gaps as needed.
As an example of IDRC's method, the need to establish baseline data on water quality in
the Dnieper River was identified in 1993 by local and international agencies as the most
pressing need related to the management of the River. In order to carry out the study,
IDRC brought together three Ukrainian institutions and granted them funding to perform the
work. The institutions were the Institute of Hydro-biology, the Ukrainian Scientific Centre for
the Protection of the Water (USCPW), and the Hydro-meteorology Institute. Interestingly,
these three institutions had never worked together in the past. To add value to the
contributions of the Ukrainian institutions, IDRC located and contracted expertise from two
foreign research facilities, in this instance, two Canadian organisations well known for their
proven capacity, The Canadian Centre for Inland Waters and the Fresh Water Institute of
Winnipeg.  Hands-on expert support was also provided through the purchase of specialised
analytical equipment from United States, Canada and Germany.
The report on the condition of the River was first published in Ukraine by the Ministry of
Environmental Protection and Nuclear Safety (MEPNS) and became the basis for the
adoption by the Verhovna Rada (Parliament) of the National Policy for the Rehabilitation of
the Dnieper. Bearing in mind this link, it can be argued that the report findings were
immediately appropriated by local authorities and internalised. There was no need in fact
for IDRC to sponsor intermediary policy papers. The findings of the study were eventually
published in the Water Quality Research Journal of Canada.
2. IDRC and the Dnieper River
2.1 Summary of the project and its principal outputs
In 1993, Canada wanted to support Ukrainian efforts to rehabilitate the Dnieper River and
asked IDRC to apply its techniques to this task. For this purpose, an initial budget of CAD 4
million was transferred to IDRC to manage a project named "Environmental Management
Development in Ukraine," or EMDU. In 1997, a second phase was approved under CIDA
financing; this phase will end in December 2000. During these six years approximately CAD
12 million will have been spent in Ukraine for that purpose, along with an additional
estimated CAD 1 million in local contributions. Seventy research projects were carried out
by local institutions ranging in value from CAD 35,000 to CAD 320,000. On average, 60%
of the total funding was used as research grants managed by various Ukrainian research
centres and institutions and the balance was spent to cover the cost of providing technical
support and management services.
2.2 Immediate results
The various research activities have produced the following immediate results:
• Information about the state of the River was obtained and organised and a network
of scientists and managers is now providing data on line for the management of the
River.
• A National Programme for Rehabilitating the Dnieper and Improving Water Quality
was approved by the Verhovna Rada. Nearly all Ukrainian respondents interviewed
stated that, among the most important results coming out of the EMDU cooperation
experience was the drafting and implementation of this policy.
• Ukraine's Ministry of Environmental Protection and Nuclear Safety has taken
measures to seek a USD 7 million grant from the Global Environment Facility (GEF)
to define a Strategic Action Plan (SAP) for the rehabilitation of the River Basin and
ameliorating its effects on the Black Sea.
• Environmental auditing and clean production concepts have been introduced and
established. A group of Ukrainian scientists has formed a consortium to provide such
audits nationally.
• Significant improvements in the provision of public utility services in the city of
Zaporizhzhia have led to the approval of a loan by EBRD (USD 30 million) to
upgrade water and sewer systems. In contrast, an adjacent city was refused a
similar loan because it has not yet learned to provide utility services in a financially
viable manner.
• Ukraine is now participating in an international network for testing and calibrating
water quality using bio-testing methods.
• Civil society has increasingly become involved in the programme through outreach
activities such as numerous television programmes for local stations and a web
page.
• The effects of ramial chip wood on soil fertility is being tested and gradually proving
to be a significant alternative to other, less environmentally friendly means of
increasing soil fertility.
3. Learning to perform in "Terra Incognita"
3.1 Differentiating transition economies from the South
Twenty five years of partnership with the South did not fully prepare IDRC to meet the
specific challenges prevailing in CIS countries. Eventually, we had to remind ourselves
regularly that a vast majority of Asian, African and American countries shared many values
and patterns of behaviour with us. Most Third World elites were trained in universities of the
North, while they where made familiar with northern governance systems through years of
colonial rule. At independence, Britain, France, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain left
behind various administrative and legal systems as well as diplomatic traditions that, for the
most part, still operate today. In addition, most tenets of a market economy were never as
profoundly challenged as they were under Soviet rule. On the other hand, countries under
Soviet rule were closed for seven decades and missed out on many of the paradigm shifts
that characterised western evolution in the twentieth century. In contrast with many
countries in the South, education in CIS countries was widespread and diverse scientific
institutions operated within a well structured system. Technological knowledge and
equipment as well as the capacity to produce research equipment was well advanced,
unlike the case of countries in the South.
3.2 Learning to function in a strikingly different context
Over the six years IDRC has been involved in the region, it has learned invaluable lessons
and gained insights into the Ukrainian milieu. Many of the problems described below have
been ameliorated in the last six years. IDRC has learned to be flexible, to work out backup
schemes where possible, and to work closely through its local partners to remedy problems
as they are foreseen or arise. Canada has benefited greatly in coming to understand better
the local conditions, modi operandi, and local players, and hopes that other organisations
as well can benefit from its acquired knowledge. The following are not intended as
criticisms, but merely as observations of local conditions, particularly as they contrast with
the more familiar conditions prevalent in the South.
• The postSoviet system now in place in the country is one of great volatility and
discontinuity. Political uncertainties and quick changes are the norm as evidenced by
various decrees that prevented funds transfers to Ukraine and suddenly taxed all
imported goods as well as bank transfers, regardless of whether they were donated
for humanitarian purposes or not.
• Some concepts, terminology, and practises did not exist under the Soviet system
and thus are not well understood: namely, economic principles, like present value,
mortgage, and collateral, are difficult to convey in a world that never employed them,
while doubleentry bookkeeping as practised in the west is new to the region. The
notion of "client" finds little echo in a world where people regularly lined up for basic
commodities and were treated with contempt by sellers, while issues related to
conflict of interest were blurred when only the Party's interests were at stake.
Similarly, the tallying of local contributions to projects is fraught with uncertainty and
difficulty, given the uncertainties regarding real costs and the distorted market under
the Soviet system: in the past, the real value of time, land, and money was not
costed. Equally, IDRC had problems understanding Ukrainian notions of banking,
accounting, and decisionmaking methods.
• Secrecy and paranoia are symptoms stemming from fundamental survival strategies
under the Soviet system. It results in many dysfunctional traits, the lack of
cooperation and information sharing between sister organisations being one of them.
IDRC found that it is not unusual for two or three organisations to be responsible for
carrying out identical work, such as measuring water quality parameters. Different
standards or testing methods may be employed by each, making meaningful data
comparisons all but impossible. There was a tendency to hoard information as well.
In carrying out Environmental Management Information projects, for example, some
database information was obtained only with great difficulty from the responsible
institutions. In all cases, IDRC worked through local government bodies to solve the
problems and, when necessary, explored alternatives, as in the case of purchasing
satellite maps from Canadian sources because Ukrainian versions were considered
to be state secrets. IDRC also learned  that the required information sharing will not
happen automatically, especially given that the break-up of the Soviet Union severed
most existing regional networks. Lingering paranoia remains at political and security
levels as well. In one particular city, local security service officers removed data from
projectrelated work and  interrogated local participants who received training in
Canada, causing significant delays in the project.
• As institutions in the region often were not plugged into international scientific
networks, they seldom employed the internationally recognised standards of
research one would assume. As the Ukrainian scientific community is overcoming its
previous isolation and becoming better integrated into the international scene, the
problem is shrinking.
• Topdown management methods are usually employed, whereby top managers issue
orders and all those under them obey. There is little input from below, from those
who might better understand the problems at hand and possible solutions. Partly as
a result, personnel often seek "cookbook" solutions, as they are not accustomed to
being given a free hand to manage the work under their expertise.
• Scientists and managers alike tend to focus on technological fixes to problems,
rather than adjusting management practices to solve problems. This preference
especially manifested itself in the audits and technologies projects, where
technologies were already slated for purchase before an audit had adequately
defined the nature of problem to be corrected. Audits demonstrated that many
problems could be solved through improved management.
• IDRC's experts were surprised to discover the lack of technologically advanced
equipment and computerisation, with little environmental data available in electronic
media. The exchange of data over a computer network among participating
institutions is a new development. Analytical equipment had to be purchased for
participating laboratories. The whole research system of Ukraine is in dire need of
reorganisation and retooling. As resources are extremely scarce, other priorities take
precedence.
• Project implementation tends to move very slowly. In many cases, the sluggishness
is due to political waffling or manoeuvring or from all decisions, even trivial ones,
being referred to a higher authority. In others, it is a result of the poor economy,
where workers may not get paid or buildings go unheated in winter; still in other
cases, poor project management can be to blame. Schedules must therefore build in
extra time to account for local conditions and project monitoring must take on great
importance.
• Although Ukraine was a separate member of the UN, diplomacy was the prerogative
of Moscow in Soviet times. At independence, laws, rules and practices had to be
written in a context of uncertainty, the absence of precedents and traditions, and
perceived abuses by so-called non-profit organisations, which often used charitable
tax exceptions to conduct commercial but tax-free business. IDRC's status as an
international non-profit organisation remains a subject of negotiations today; this lack
of a clear status as a "not for profit" organisation constraints IDRC's ability to fully
dispense research grants to local NGOs, institutions and bona fide organisations as
it does elsewhere.
4. Western aid from the Ukrainian perspective
4.1 Moving away from the Soviet era
International technical assistance to Ukraine did not really exist before 1991, when Ukraine
gained its independence. Receiving grant money, let alone receiving it from former foes,
was, needless to say, a new concept. At first, some influential officials were even against
the idea of receiving any "paltry dole" from "capitalistic hands"; the "self-sufficiency"
ideology dominated, with the world changing faster than minds. Many perceived that
western donor agencies were coming simply to collect data about the current status of
science and to state the problems, but were not there to help resolve these problems. 
When the first years of independence passed and the economic miracles did not happen,
politicians realised that structural changes were necessary and that without western money
and know-how economic growth in Ukraine would remain elusive. Developed countries
started to be perceived, not as source of danger, but as a source of funds and ideas. Fear
and pride started to dissipate and Ukraine found itself in free competition with the South for
the North's grant money. Yet, in the event, it became obvious that the absorptive capacity
for western assistance was low.
• During the Soviet era, numerous research institutes and ministries were accustomed
to abundant budget financing. In particular, fundamental research found favour in the
state budget. The strategy for receiving financing was to submit a thick folio full of
scientific jargon, very detailed background information, and a long list of references.
Budgets consisted of only the total project sum, which was intentionally doubled or
even tripled. Peer review and systems of checks and balances were not common
practises. In effect, the most important factor for budget appropriation was related to
an established network of decision makers, government officials, and civil servants.
Therefore, positioning one's institution well in those networks ensured a regular flow
of research funds.
• When international technical assistance became available, research institutes began
using the same approach that they did in the past to get funds, with many perceiving
the assistance as a continuation of budget funding. This was the first stumbling block
for Ukrainian scientists and researchers looking for donor aid: the strategy that
worked well for the Soviet bureaucratic machine became useless for foreign aid
projects. Demands for "unwarranted details" were often perceived as captious or
even espionage. It was feared that by answering such probing questions, scientist
might run into problems with authorities. The flexibility shown by some donors, along
with their tolerance and understanding, were the main reasons for the acceptance of
technical assistance in the first years of Ukraine's independence.
• By the mid-1990s, almost all research institutions in Ukraine had had some
exposure to the grant process. They formulated an assembly line approach to
proposal preparation: identical proposals were sent to different donors, duplicate
reports were submitted as outputs, and old data were used.
• By the late 1990s, proposals fell more in line with donors' demands: years of
teaching and learning yielded fruit. Nonetheless, the technical and budgetary content
remained poor.
• If in the early and mid-1990s only US, Canadian, and UN agencies were working in
Ukraine in the environmental field, by the late 1990s Japan, the Netherlands,
Denmark, and Finland also became active. Every donor has its own target
areas, expectations, and, most importantly, implementation mechanism.
Unfortunately, most of the implementation mechanisms are alike: to spend as much
money as possible in the donor country itself. Some donors even have rules that
forbid recipients from buying equipment outside the donor's country, while others do
not use local consultants, relying instead solely on expensive western consultants.
The main outputs of such assistance are reports that often are not even read by
local officials and decision-makers. For this reason, the Verhovna Rada and the
Cabinet of Ministers admonished donor agencies. After much hesitation,
international technical assistance was eventually exempted from VAT and import
duties by President Kuchma's decree only on June 1, 1999, 8 years after
independence. The  exemption lasted exactly 2 months, with the Verhovna Rada
overturning it on July 30, stating that the provisions of the proposed decree were
insufficiently rigorous as "in many cases international assistance that is not required
is given to Ukraine". In particular, the Verhovna Rada wished to ensure that such
exemptions would not be turned into loopholes for tax-free commercial imports, nor
become a means for western interests to rid themselves of poor quality products and
services.
• A precedent for a new type of international technical assistance, which fully complies
with national interests, was established by IDRC and implemented through EMDU,
one of the first environmental technical assistance programmes in Ukraine. For
many local environmental institutions, it was the first chance to communicate directly
with an international agency. Scepticism and prudence were the main hallmarks of
donor-recipient relations, with the recipient's approach to obtaining funds being
simple and direct: give us a lump sum and we will solve a problem. Questions about
project details, work schedules, methodology, and detailed budgets were not easily
understood by recipient institutions. IDRC's flexibility and compromise-oriented
philosophy later came to be greatly appreciated by the Ministry of Environmental
Protection and Nuclear Safety.
The following two sections reflect the comments of Ukrainian partners in response to
questions posed in interviews as described in Notes and References.
4.2 Perceived positive aspects of the IDRC programme
• There exists an atmosphere of trust, confidence, and real partnership between IDRC
and Ukrainian recipients. IDRC's consultants and staff never force their views upon
recipients but are open to discussing and exploring all avenues for solving problems.
• All project managers are local Ukrainians and they feel they have a great deal of
independence, hiring necessary specialists, choosing appropriate equipment,
approving trips within the project budget, etc. Using IDRC's approach, more money
is spent locally and more money reaches Ukrainian scientists and consultants. No
other donor agency in Ukraine spends 60% of its funds in the recipient country
(taking into account the rent for the local IDRC office and local staff salaries the
percentage is even higher).
• Many of the projects carried out under EMDU were very practical with outcomes that will
last beyond the end of EMDU and funding from IDRC. Real tangible results can be
seen going beyond the usual reports and publications whose utility to locals is
questionable. Among these are the river bank protection strip, the remediated landfill
in Zaporizhzhia, modernised equipment for several audited enterprises, water
treatment units for hospitals, kindergartens, and schools, et al.
• A large training component has allowed many Ukrainian specialists to upgrade their
skills and qualifications in Canada and other countries. Many scientists participated
in international workshops and conferences thanks to EMDU grants.  
4.3 Perceived negative aspects of the IDRC programme
• What IDRC understood as benign intrusion in practising due diligence and enquiring
about administrative and technical issues was regarded as severe probing by
recipient institutions. IDRC's approval was expected to be forthright and simple.
Sometimes recipients have to revise a proposal four or five times before IDRC 
approves it. This has led to the senior scientific adviser of IDRC being referred to as
"Dr. Niet" (sic).
• Proposal approval, contract preparation, and transfers of funds can take much time.
In the current poor economic conditions for many scientists in Ukraine, donor money
is the only means of support and delays thus cause nervousness.
• The list of reports that have to be prepared, along with the final project outputs, is
quite long. Many recipients do not see any real purpose and value with the
preparation of some of these reports. Moreover, the list tends to grow over time. For
instance, Results Base Management and time sheets for workers on the project
were recently added, joining gender, training, and local contributions reports as a
requirement.
• From the outset, IDRC suggested greater involvement of Ukrainian civil society,
increased public participation, and NGO involvement. These ideas ran counter to
seventy years of socialism and difficult to internalise. In the past, government
officials flooded thousands of hectares of arable land and hundreds of villages
without consultations in order to build a hydroelectric station on the Dnieper. With
respect to NGOs, Ukrainian scientists granted them little credit as they perceived
NGOs as lacking professionalism and being driven by emotions and political
considerations. They also questioned NGO accountability. A few projects, however,
met with strong opposition at the village level that had to be dealt with in a manner
similar to that in any other democracy, through consultation and grass-root
negotiations, thus vindicating IDRC's initial preoccupation.
5. Key solutions to new problems
To cope with this different environment, IDRC had to adapt quickly and tailor its approach
to resolving unprecedented problems. In the South, IDRC provides research grants directly
to local institutions by making use of one of its seven regional offices to transfer moneys
and to provide technical and administrative support locally. This approach was impossible
in Ukraine and different means had to be found. The cooperation of MEPNS became an
essential element. The various Ministers and Deputy-ministers who oversaw MEPNS
during those six years were determined to improve the quality of the water in the Dnieper,
or as transliterated from Ukrainian, Dnipro, and to make good on Canadian cooperation.
Their full collaboration and strong commitment became a key ingredient in what we jointly
like to believe became a success story.
5.1 Dealing with management issues
A local Management Committee was created at the outset of this diversified programme
to provide coordination between various departments and research institutions and with
IDRC. In October 1995, the Management Committee was empowered to draft policy, to set
priorities, to allocate research resources, to select local partners, to assess proposals, and
to review scientific results. In sum, the Committee was providing overall governance to the
programme. It has proven to be an invaluable mechanism which corresponded well to the
culture of the region. It provided needed discipline and rigour as well as a forum for
discussing problems, raising issues, and debating new ideas. Most of all, it fully involved
Ukraine and Ukrainians in every decision and significantly contributed to stimulating their
feeling of ownership and responsibility. It may be argued that the Management Committee
was the embryo of a peer review system. The commitment of Ukraine was constant and
unfaltering throughout the duration of EMDU; despite the fact that two elections took place,
the head of the Committee remained in place and the Committee continued meeting
monthly.
5.2 Dealing with fiscal issues
The problem of disbursing funds for local research remained unresolved for some time.
Faced with what can only be described as "predatory" fiscal systems, IDRC had no choice
but to help MEPNS find a durable and practical solution for moving aid resources into the
country. For that purpose, the Dnipro Fund was created based on a model initially
operating in Poland. This newly created Ukrainian NGO was empowered to collect fines
and grants and spend them for the purpose of improving the Dnieper's environment. This
became the conduit of IDRC's grants to local research institutions and remains its only
mechanism to this day. The Dnipro Fund has expanded its activities to promote
environmental audits and it now functions as a fund raising and management facility in
Belarus and Russia.
6. Learning together
6.1 Main lessons learned by Ukrainians
• EMDU, especially through the work of the Management Committee, allowed
managers and many scientists to look at their problems more globally and to work as
a team, especially when solving critical problems.  
• Recipient institutions have learned how to prepare and submit proposals, conduct
internationally recognised research, and write reports.
• Dealing with an increasingly vocal, if atomised, civil society was difficult at first.
MEPNS officials and institute managers learned to adjust plans and environmental
activities to meet the needs of people. 
6.2 Lessons learned by IDRC from errors made
6.2.1 Concerning Gender equality policy
Every Canadian ODA sponsored project must comply to a gender policy and demonstrate
results for each activity. For that purpose, IDRC hired in 1995 an "expensive" (sic)
Canadian consultant to draft an assessment of the situation in Ukraine and propose a plan
of action. Ukrainian partners remained sceptical of IDRC's efforts in promoting gender
sensitivity and they still do not see this as a priority issue. The near complete lack of
women in senior decisionmaking positions is not perceived as a problem so it follows that
there is no need to modify current practises. Respondents to this current assessment argue
that: "There is no infringement of women's rights in Ukraine, there are simply cultural and
historical traditions for women to be housekeepers and family caretakers and to be away
from policy and management matters. Why must the ratio of men to women be 50/50? We
do not expect 50% of women to be anglers or hunters, so why would we expect this
percentage among managers? Those women who wish to become managers can easily
exercise their right to do so and there are examples among acting ministers and the Vice-
Premier Minister."
The current situation in Ukraine regarding equality of rights and access to work by women
has proven to be sophisticated and complex. Indeed, there is a barrier at the upper
echelons of the country, which some local experts characterise as a "benevolent
patriarchy." Women have full access to schooling even to university level, as well as to the
workplace, yet the rules of an "old boys' club" constitute a handicap for many women to rise
to senior positions. More importantly, however, the workload within the married couple is
unevenly balanced, leaving the working woman with a very heavy burden. These two
factors combine to incite many women not to seek high ranking positions. IDRC's current
focus of environmental research activities does not lend itself to achieving much significant
change. This specific barrier is not only misunderstood by the average male executive, but
strongly denied when the issue is raised. Proselytising foreigners are unlikely to achieve
much.
In the future, gender research by local institutions must be carried out to help understand
the empirical nature of the barriers and document it in a manner that may be understood by
Ukrainians. Making use of western experiences is not only often irrelevant but counter-
productive, as Ukraine is far from a society where women are denied basic rights.
Requiring proof of compliance to a foreign-imposed gender policy, as has been our
practise, is more likely to breed cynicism and to raise traditional bureaucratic defence
mechanisms than to give good results.
6.2.2 Concerning management
In beginning activities in Ukraine, IDRC received proposals that tended to look at budgets
and work plans in very general terms; that is, budget and work packet breakdowns were,
when included at all, often not very specific or well thought out, and little attention was paid
to what materials or labour actually cost. Organisations tended to ask for a large lump sum
of money to perform nebulous work. 
Faced with this inadequate documentation, IDRC organised in 1994 a training seminar to
lecture heads of research institutes on how to prepare project documentation for western
consumption. This attempt failed as it was perceived as condescending and irrelevant.
Proposal preparation and project management improved immensely by the end of EMDU1
with hands-on advice and coaching from IDRC on a case by case basis and vigilance on
the part of the Management Committee. This method may be time and resource costly, but
regular progress has been observed once those budgetary demands were fully explained
and understood as final. 
7. Conclusions
7.1 IDRC's demand-driven methodology
As IDRC compared notes with other western organisations active in the region, the
importance of capacity building methods and approaches became ever more apparent. It is
useful to remind the audience at this juncture that there are four critical aspects for project
delivery: 1) complete ownership by recipient countries 2) best financial and operational
management 3) highest scientific and technical standards and 4) collaboration with other
partners. It is essential to assure a good balance among these four complementary goals.
However, experience has shown that in practise projects are often skewed in favour of one
or the other of these goals; generally, priority is put on ensuring that all procurement and
accounting procedures will be meticulously adhered to and pressure is put on foreign
experts and consultants to obtain and demonstrate visible results as a result of "supply
driven technical assistance." As a result: 
• there is an over-emphasis on immediate, tangible results such as reports;
• local ownership and capacity building suffers;
• long-term sustainability is left in doubt.
In contrast, the demanddriven methodology of IDRC is now being heralded by Ukrainian
authorities as a unique and effective model. Ukrainian partners have expressed a
preference for the management methods employed in EMDU, bemoaning the fact that
many other aid organisations do not operate in this manner but rather rely on extensive use
of expensive foreign consultants. Recently, based on this experience, MEPNS has
demanded that two donor agencies use the same implementation mechanism that IDRC
does.
7.2 Acting pragmatically and focusing on concrete products
It became obvious from day one that pragmatism should govern our work in such a unique
environment. As an example, one of IDRC's very first "research grants" was for the
gathering of telephone numbers within the Ministry of Environment Protection and Nuclear
Safety and the publishing of a phone directory. 
IDRC eventually realised that, during the Soviet era, the military was the only client that
effectively took care of transforming a new technology into practical usage and deriving
know-how. Highly trained scientists in Ukraine had acquired little experience in those fields
and the search for improved know-how and management became our most pressing task. 
Building on the existing science that they knew about and coaching the acquisition of new
skills in know-how and management, we followed Picasso's pedagogy.
7.3 Changing mindsets and ensuring sustainability
By building relationships based on trust, carrying out business in an open and transparent
fashion, relying on local partners as equals, employing local talent to the greatest possible
degree, and choosing to build up local institutions to function without its help, IDRC has
been able to achieve its goals. 
In the end, the authors believe that important changes in the mindsets are being left
behind. In particular, confidence and self-esteem are a most significant outcome of this
programme. Scientists and managers have come to recognise themselves as a part of the
world scientific elite and they now feel that their opinions are respected and can have an
influence on policies. They feel capable of defending Ukrainian interests within the region
and internationally. Second, the capacity to work cooperatively and to take decisions
collegially has significantly been improved; this attitude is essential when dealing with
protracted and complex environmental problems such as those that plague the Dnieper
River.
IDRC and MEPNS have tried to develop a sustainable approach to capacity building. Will
that method withstand the test of time? The answer will have to come at a future time.
Notes and References
Disclaimer
The ideas expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of
IDRC.
Methodology
In preparing this survey, Dr. Iskra conducted a series of "unstructured interviews" with principal
Ukrainian EMDU partners involved either at the management or at the scientific level. The
interviews were conducted between August 21 and 31, 2000. The notes from these interviews have
been summarised in section 4 and related observations have been inserted into section 5 and 6.
The c onclus ions rea ched  in section 7 are  those  of the au thors of th is pape r. 
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